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Abstract 
The topic of this thesis is the leverage effect i.e. asymmetric volatility. The leverage effect 
describes the negative relationship between asset value and volatility. The purpose is to 
examine if firm specific variables impact the size of the leverage effect, in order to bring 
additional insights into the missing gap in the research field. The study is conducted on 1,311 
U.S. companies active on NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between 1996 
and 2015. Two GARCH models are applied to estimate the asymmetric volatility; the GJR-
GARCH(1,1) and the EGARCH(1,1) models. Panel data models are used in order to 
investigate how the firm specific variables influence the leverage effect. The findings of this 
paper show that two out of the eight used variables significantly impact the leverage effect; 
the firm size and the beta. One of the variables deemed insignificant is the debt-to-equity 
ratio, which contradicts the original hypothesis behind the leverage effect by Black (1976). 
Thus, this study concludes that firm specific variables impact the size of the leverage effect. 
However, the deemed insignificance for six of the variables show that not all variables 
influence the leverage effect. Furthermore, the sign and the size of the coefficients differ 
between the variables, with some being more influential than others.  
Keywords: leverage effect, asymmetric volatility, firm specific variables, volatility, GJR-
GARCH, EGARCH, panel data.   
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1.  Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is the leverage effect, i.e. asymmetric volatility1. The leverage effect 
describes the negative relationship between asset value and volatility. A general explanation is 
that negative shocks/news increases the volatility more than positive shocks/news of equal 
size (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982).  
Several studies have observed the existence of the leverage effect for different countries and 
markets (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; Schwert, 1989; Braun, Nelson & Sunier, 1995). 
However, researchers are still divided regarding which factors that influence the size of the 
leverage effect. 
The original hypothesis behind the leverage effect was that when the price of a stock falls, the 
equity also decreases while the debt is constant, making the firm riskier and more sensitive to 
negative shocks, due to a higher debt-to-equity ratio (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982). The 
increased risk associated with a higher debt-to-equity ratio is consistent with corporate 
finance theories, which states that a company’s default risk increases with its debt-to-equity 
ratio (Black, 1976; Ogden, Jen, & O’Conner, 2003).  
It has however been deemed unlikely that the leverage effect can be solely explained by the 
debt-to-equity ratio (Aït-Sahalia, Fan, & Li, 2013). Figlewski & Wang (2000) showed that 
when the capital structure for a company changed, there was no effect on the volatility, which 
goes against the arguments from Black (1976) and Christie (1982). Furthermore, the existence 
of the leverage effect has been observed for both the commodity and the currency markets. 
Strengthening the argument that the leverage effect is not caused by the debt-to-equity ratio, 
since neither commodities nor currencies are subject to a capital structure (Wang & Yang, 
2009; Chevallier & Ielpo, 2017). 
Another popular theory regarding the cause of the leverage effect is the volatility feedback 
effect, also known as the risk premium hypothesis (Bollerslev, Litvinova & Tauchen, 2006). 
The theory argues that an increase in unexpected volatility will increase expected future 
volatility. This will in turn give rise to higher excepted returns and hence cause the prices to 
decrease, leading to volatility asymmetry. The debt-to-equity ratio is according to the theory 
therefore not the cause of the leverage effect (Bekaert & Wu, 2000). Several researchers have 
                                                          
1 The leverage effect explanation has become synonymous with asymmetric volatility and the terms are used 
interchangeable. 
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found empirical evidence that supports the volatility feedback effect (Pindyck, 1984; Frech, 
Scwert & Stambaugh, 1987; Bekaert & Wu, 2000; Mayfield, 2004).  
Moreover, studies have shown that the leverage effect differs in size between companies 
(Bekaert & Wu, 2000), with some firms being more affected by higher or lower asymmetric 
volatility compared to other firms (Aboura & Wagner, 2016). The leverage effect could hence 
be argued to be impacted by firm specific variables, which is the focus point of this thesis. 
Research concerning if firm specific variables impact the leverage effect is scarce. Voogd & 
Geschiere (2015) constitutes the only previous research concerning this topic. The paper was 
conducted on European data with a limited sample of 290 companies and investigated the 
influence of four firm specific variables. The paper found that three out of the four variables 
significantly impacts the size of the leverage effect (Voogd & Geschiere, 2015). 
Based on the findings by Voogd & Geschiere (2015) and the lack of additional research, there 
is an opportunity to add new contributions to the research topic. By expanding the research 
focus through an increased sample, more firm variables and additional estimation models this 
can help and minimize the missing gap in the research field (Denscombe, 2009). Furthermore, 
since the previous study was conducted on European data, it is of interest to apply the same 
topic on U.S. financial data (Dahmström, 2011; Voogd, Geschiere, 2015). U.S. data is 
considered the preferred data when conducting economic research (Ryan, Scapens, Theobald, 
& Beattie, 2002). 
1.1. Research Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose and aim of this paper is to examine if and to what extent different firm specific 
variables impact the leverage effect.  
The research questions are: 
- Do firm specific variables impact the size of the leverage effect? 
- If so, how and to what extent do the variables impact the leverage effect? 
1.2. Thesis structure  
The structure is as follows: the first chapter outlines the background of the subject, states the 
purpose and stipulates the research questions. Chapter 2 explains the theoretical background 
to volatility, models of changing volatility and models of asymmetric volatility. The chapter 
ends with a theoretical background and motivation for each of the firm specific variables used 
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in this thesis. The data used is described and motivated for in chapter 3, with a thorough 
description of the collection and screening process. In chapter 4, the methodology is presented 
with an explanation regarding the research approach. This includes the method for estimating 
the asymmetric volatility and description of the panel data models used to answer the research 
questions. The results are presented and interpreted in chapter 5, each firm specific variables 
impact on the leverage effect is analyzed. Finally, the last chapter provides a summary of the 
paper as well as suggestions for further research that was found during the study. 
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
This chapter starts with an explanation of volatility to give a brief understanding of the 
volatility concept2. Thereafter, models of changing volatility and models of asymmetric 
volatility are presented. The chapter ends with motivation and theoretical arguments for each 
of the eight firm specific variables used in this thesis.  
2.1. Models of Changing Volatility 
Volatility is the most common risk measure in finance and refers to the risk associated with 
the up- and downwards movements to the value of an asset (Byström, 2014). The concept is 
used in several financial models including; Black-Scholes model, the Sharpe-ratio, the Merton 
model, etc. (Sharpe, 1964; Black & Scholes, 1973; Campbell, Lo, & Macinlay, 1998).  
Historical observations of financial data regarding asset prices have shown that volatility is 
not constant over time (Mandelbrot, 1963). It has been observed that large returns are often 
followed by other large returns and vice versa, a phenomenon known as volatility clustering 
or heteroscedasticity (Mandelbrot, 1963; Schwert & Seguin, 1990). The shift in volatility over 
time is caused by the perceived market and firm specific risks not being constant, making 
some periods riskier than others (Brooks, 2014).  
2.1.1. Unconditional and Conditional Forecasting 
Unconditional volatility can be described as a mean of the volatility for an observed period 
(Hayashi, 2000). The approach is straightforward and can be useful if yesterday’s return is not 
explicitly observed. If it’s not possible to determine yesterday’s volatility the best guess for 
tomorrow’s volatility would be the mean for the entire period, i.e. the unconditional volatility 
(Asgharian, 2016). However, this means that the model does not take the volatility clustering 
                                                          
2 The volatility is the standardized variance, calculated by taking the square root of the variance.  
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into consideration (Brooks, 2014).  
On the contrary, the conditional forecast method incorporates the information available at 
each time period. Hence, if the volatility for each period can be observed then the conditional 
forecast method can be applied (Hayashi, 2000: Brooks, 2014). The name, conditional, refers 
to the fact that the model is conditional on knowing yesterday’s volatility (Brooks, 2014).    
In conclusion, unconditional forecast is less efficient than conditional forecasts due to 
volatility clustering. Conditional forecasts take volatility clustering into consideration by 
incorporating the information available at each period; the two models therefore do not 
provide exactly the same result (Campbell et al, 1998). The most well-known and used 
models for forecasting conditional variance are the ARCH(q) and the GARCH(p,q) models 
(Hayashi, 2000).  
2.1.2. ARCH(q) Models 
Based on the existence of volatility clustering, Engle (1982) proposed the Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model. This was the first model that in a relative 
accessible way allowed for the forecast of conditional volatility. The idea behind the model is 
that it does not assume constant variance (Engle, 1982; Campbell et al, 1998; Brooks, 2014). 
The ARCH(q) model is estimated by taking the squared errors and letting the errors depend 
on the lags (q) (Brooks, 2014).  
The general ARCH(q) model is stated below (Brooks, 2014):  
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝑢𝑡−2
2 +. . . +𝛼𝑞𝑢𝑡−𝑞
2  
 
 
(1) 
 
The unconditional variance for ARCH(q):  
 
𝜎2 =
𝛼0
1 − 𝛼1 − 𝛼2−. . . −𝛼𝑞
 
 
 
(2) 
 
The conditional variance for ARCH(q): 
𝜎𝑡
2 = Var (𝑢𝑡⃒ Ω𝑡−1) = E [𝑢𝑡 − E(𝑢𝑡))
2⃒ Ω𝑡−1] 
 
 
(3) 
 
The Ω in equation 3 is known as the information set. In the literature, it is assumed 
that E(ut) = 0, making it possible to rewrite the equation as stated below (Brooks, 2014): 
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𝜎𝑡
2 = Var (𝑢𝑡⃒Ω𝑡−1) = E [𝑢𝑡
2⃒Ω𝑡−1] 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
Under homoscedasticity, the conditional variance will be equal to the unconditional variance 
(Hayashi, 2000).  
However, there are drawbacks related to the ARCH(q) model that should be considered. The 
model can require a large number of lags (q), making it hard to implement in practice 
(Hayashi, 2000). Furthermore, there is a risk that the model will violate the non-negativity 
constraints. The model requires that 𝛼 > 0, otherwise the ARCH(q) model might predict 
negative volatility (𝜎𝑡
2 < 0), which in reality is impossible (Brooks, 2014). 
2.1.3. GARCH(p,q) Models 
In line with the drawbacks for the ARCH(q) model, Bollerslev (1986) developed an improved 
version known as the Generalized ARCH (GARCH) model. The difference being that the 
GARCH model allows the conditional variance to be dependent on its own past values of the 
squared errors and on the past conditional variance (Bollerslev, 1986; Brooks, 2014). 
 The general GARCH(p,q) model is stated below (Brooks, 2014): 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝑢𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
𝜎𝑡−𝑗
2  
 
 
 
(5) 
 
Research has shown that a GARCH(1,1) model is often sufficient enough to estimate the 
volatility (Brooks, 2014). Therefore, in comparison with the ARCH(q) model, there is often 
no need to plot a larger number of lags than required for a GARCH(1,1) model (Brooks, 
2014).  
A GARCH(1,1) model is stated below (Brooks, 2014):  
The mean equation: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
 
(6) 
The variance equation: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2  
 
 
(7) 
 
The 𝜔 in equation 7 is a constant term and 𝑢𝑡−1
2  measures the shocks in volatility. The 
additional term compared with the ARCH(q) model is the forecasted variance from yesterday, 
given as 𝜎𝑡−1
2 . 
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If the condition that 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1 is fulfilled then the unconditional variance for a GARCH(1,1) 
can be written as follow (Asgharian, 2016): 
𝜎2 = E[𝜎𝑡+1
2 ] = E[𝜔 + 𝛼𝑢𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡
2] 
 
 
(8) 
 
= 𝜔 + 𝛼𝐸[𝑢𝑡
2] + 𝛽𝐸[𝜎𝑡
2] 
 
 
(9) 
 
𝜎2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝜎2 + 𝛽𝜎2 
 
 
(10) 
 
𝜎2 =
𝜔
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
 
 
 
(11) 
 
To conclude, advantages with the GARCH model compared to the ARCH model is that it 
incorporates yesterday’s forecasted variance and that the model uses fewer parameters, 
making it less likely to violate the non-negativity constraint (Campbell et al, 1998). However, 
neither one of the models are able to incorporate the asymmetric volatility. To adjust for this 
condition, several models have been developed using the GARCH model as the foundation 
(Hayashi, 2000: Brooks, 2014; Asgharian, 2016). 
2.2. Models of Asymmetric Volatility  
Two commonly used models to estimate the asymmetric volatility are the Exponential 
GARCH (EGARCH) and the GJR-GARCH models (Brooks, 2014). Both models are 
developed from the original GARCH model, as stated in the previous subsection 2.1.3.   
2.2.1. EGARCH model 
The EGARCH model was the first model able to incorporate the asymmetric volatility 
(Nelson, 1991). Empirical studies have shown that the EGARCH provides a more accurate 
result compared to the conventional GARCH model (Alberg, Shalit, & Yosef, 2008). 
Indicating that incorporating the asymmetric volatility yields a more adequate result. 
The EGARCH variance equation with a normal distribution is stated below (Brooks, 2014): 
Ln(𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝜔 + 𝛽 ln(𝜎𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝛾
𝑢𝑡−1
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
+ 𝛼 [ 
∣ 𝑢𝑡−1 ∣
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
 ] 
 
 
 
(12) 
 
Explanation of the variables used in the EGARCH model: 
𝝎: is the intercept for the variance. 
𝜷:  is the coefficient for the logged GARCH term.  
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𝒍𝒏(𝝈𝒕−𝟏
𝟐 ): is the logged GARCH term. 
𝜸:  is the scale of the asymmetric volatility. 
𝜸
𝒖𝒕−𝟏
√𝝈𝒕−𝟏
𝟐
 : is the last period’s shock which is standardized.  
[
∣𝒖𝒕−𝟏∣
√𝝈𝒕−𝟏
𝟐
− √
𝟐
𝝅
 ]: is the parameter that takes into account the absolute value of last            
period’s volatility shock. It replaces the regular ARCH term.  
The model captures the asymmetric volatility through the variable gamma (𝛾). The sign of the 
gamma determines the size of the asymmetric volatility and if the asymmetric volatility is 
positive or negative (Brooks, 2014):  
If 𝛾 = 0, symmetry i.e. no asymmetric volatility. 
If 𝛾 < 0 negative shocks will increase the volatility more than positive shocks. 
If 𝛾 > 0 positive shocks increase the volatility more than negative shocks. 
Given that the model uses the log of the variance (𝜎𝑡
2) this means that even if the parameters 
are negative, the variance will still be positive. Therefore, the model is not subject to the non-
negativity constraints (Nelson, 1991; Brooks, 2014). 
2.2.2. GJR-GARCH model 
The other commonly used model to incorporate asymmetric volatility was developed by 
Glosten, Jagannathan & Runkle (1993). The model is called GJR-GARCH and an advantage 
with the model is that the variance is directly modeled and does not use the natural logarithm 
like the EGARCH model. This means that the GJR-GARCH is simpler to implement in 
practice (Hayashi, 2000). Studies that have applied several GARCH models have deemed the 
GJR-GARCH the most sufficient in forecasting the volatility and VaR estimation (Su & 
Chen, 2009; Liu & Hung, 2010).  
The GJR-GARCH(1,1) model is stated in the equation below (Asgharian, 2016):  
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜂𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝛪𝑡−1𝜂𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2  
 
 
(13) 
 
Explanation of the variables used in the GRJ-GARCH model: 
𝝈𝒕
𝟐:  is the conditional forecasted variance. 
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𝝎:   is the intercept for the variance. 
𝜶𝟏𝜼𝒕−𝟏
𝟐 :  is the variance that depends on previous lag error terms. 
𝜶𝟐:  :  is the scale of the asymmetric volatility. 
𝜤𝒕−𝟏: is a dummy variable. 
𝜷: is the coefficient for yesterdays forecasted variance. 
𝝈𝒕−𝟏
𝟐 : yesterday’s forecasted variance. 
𝛪𝑡−1 is a dummy variable that is only activated if the previous shock is negative (𝜂𝑡−1 < 0),  
allowing the GJR-GARCH to take the leverage effect into consideration (Glosten et al, 1993; 
Asgharian, 2016). 
𝛪𝑡−1 = {
1 if 𝜂𝑡−1 < 0
0 otherwise
 
Equation 13 show that in the case of α2= 0 the GJR-GARCH becomes a regular symmetric 
GARCH(1,1) model. A negative shock is captured by (𝛼1 + 𝛼2) and a positive shock is 
captured by 𝛼1 (Asgharian, 2016). The sign of the leverage effect is the opposite compared to 
the EGARCH (Dutta, 2014). 
If 𝛼2 = 0, symmetry i.e. no asymmetric volatility. 
If𝛼2 > 0 negative shocks will increase the volatility more than positive shocks. 
If 𝛼2 < 0 positive shocks increase the volatility more than negative shock. 
2.3. Firm Specific Variables  
In line with the content in section 1, research regarding firm specific variables impact on the 
leverage effect is scarce. Previous research has focused on behavior finance (Hibbert, Daigler, 
& Dupoyet, 2008), the volatility feedback effect (Bollerslev et al, 2006) and financial 
leverage (Black, 1976) in trying to explain the leverage effect. 
This paper uses eight firm specific variables, selected based on previous research and their 
believed signaling of different firm attributes; financial health, risk, investors future 
expectations etc. The first four variables are chosen because they were included in the 
previous study by Voogd & Geschiere (2015), making them interesting for comparability. The 
new variables that have never been tested before is the industry variable, the EV-to-EBITDA 
multiple, the beta variable and the dividend yield.   
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Each variable are presented and motivated for in the subsections below. Given the lack of 
previous research concerning this topic, the argumentations for the potential relationship 
between the variables and the leverage effect is in large part made by the authors. 
2.3.1. Debt-to-Equity Ratio  
The debt-to-equity ratio is a measurement of a firm’s debt as a percentage of the equity. The 
ratio is calculated using the below formula (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014): 
𝐷
𝐸
=
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)
 
 
 
(14) 
 
The debt-to-equity ratio was the first firm specific variable that tried to explain the leverage 
effect; it is also one of the most disputed. The theory is that an increased debt-to-equity ratio 
from a decrease in stock value would increase the risk since the debt would constitute a larger 
part of the company’s total capital structure (Black, 1976). A higher debt-to-equity ratio 
signals higher distress cost, meaning that the share becomes riskier, which leads to further 
volatile share trades (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982).  
A similar argument is that the return on equity is expected to increase in a linear function with 
the debt-ratio according to proposition II by Modigliani & Miller (1958). Assuming that the 
debt is risk-free and that lenders are entitled to their lent capital, the risk is completely on the 
equity holders if the firm defaults (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).  
The initial argument is that a higher debt-to-equity ratio enhances the leverage effect (Black, 
1976). Therefore, it can be logical to expect that companies who exhibit a higher debt-to-
equity ratio will be more affected by the leverage effect compared to companies with a lower 
debt ratio. The presumed connection is therefore that higher debt-to-equity ratio will increase 
the leverage effect, following the arguments from Black (1976). 
On the contrary, research has shown that when the capital structure of a firm changed, it did 
not provide any impact on the volatility of the stock. Leading to the conclusion that financial 
leverage has no influence on the leverage effect (Figlewski & Wang, 2000). In a similar 
manner, Hasanhodzic & Lo (2011) writes that the leverage effect is equal or even larger for 
all-equity companies, meaning that debt does not influence the leverage effect. The variance 
in stock volatility has also been shown to be affected only by a small part from financial 
leverage (Schwert, 1989). Voogd & Geschiere (2015) further showed evidence that the debt-
10 
 
to-equity have no impact on the leverage effect. The debt-to-equity ratio should according to 
these researchers therefore show no significant impact on the leverage effect. 
In conclusion, the debt-to-equity ratio will be used in this thesis to examine the theory of 
Black (1976) and critics that state that financial leverage doesn’t impact the leverage effect. 
2.3.2. Price-Earnings Multiple  
The price-earnings ratio (P/E-ratio) is the most common financial measure used value a 
company (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2015). The P/E-ratio is calculated using the below 
formula: 
𝑃/𝐸 =
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
 
 
 
(15) 
 
The P/E-ratio is based on the assumption that the value of a share is expected to be 
proportional to the level of earnings (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). A high P/E-ratio can be an 
indication of several circumstances; the firm can be overvalued, it might have high expected 
growth opportunities or it can be active in a hyped industry (Basu, 1997; Berk & DeMarzo, 
2014; Wan-Ting, 2014). The P/E-ratio has been criticized for not being a good ratio to 
evaluate the value of the company or forward thinking because it’s based on historical values 
(Wan-Ting, 2014; Koller et al, 2015). 
A connection between the P/E-ratio and the leverage effect can be that the P/E-ratio is often 
one of the reasons why investors buy a certain stock. Bradshaw (2002) writes that 76% of the 
sell-analysts justify their buy-recommendation based on the P/E-ratio. It may therefore be 
possible to argue that numerous investors that buy stocks have taken the P/E-ratio into 
account and hence have an idea or investment plan regarding the stock based on the P/E-ratio. 
However, if the stock would to experience negative shocks, investors could get unsure of the 
investments due to behavioral finance factors, such as risk aversion (Hibbert et al, 2008). 
Investors can feel uncertain regarding the future growth expectation of the stock which leads 
to more volatile trades (Wan-Ting, 2014). Equation 16 shows the P/E-ratio written in 
valuation form; this shows that the growth (g) is incorporated in the P/E-ratio (Damodaran, 
2006). Hence, companies with higher growth are likely to be impacted by a larger leverage 
effect since investors become unsure regarding if the high growth expectation will pay off 
(Hibbert et al, 2008).  
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𝑃/𝐸 =
𝐷0
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
 
 
(16) 
 
Another interesting reason to use the P/E-ratio as an explanatory variable is that overvalued 
stocks (high P/E) will in theory convert down to the equilibrium valuation over time 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishmy, 1994). Investors in possession of these stocks can identify 
the overvaluation and the trades may get more volatile because the real value of the company 
is unsure, which can increase the leverage effect. The theory that higher P/E-ratio will 
increase the leverage effect is strengthened by the findings from Voogd & Geschiere (2015), 
who showed a positive relationship between the P/E-ratio and the leverage effect.  
On the contrary, La Porta, Lakonishok, Schleifer & Vishny (1997) showed that stocks bought 
based on their high P/E-ratio are often used as long-term investments in a portfolio, 
contradicting that higher P/E-ratios positively impact the leverage effect. Investors simply 
won’t react if the stock experiences negative shocks since they will not deviate from their 
original investment plan (Dreman & Berry, 1995; La Porta,et al, 1997). The inactivity can be 
explained by the long time-horizon and confidence that the investment will yield a positive 
payoff (La Porta et al, 1997; Hibbert et al, 2008).  
In conclusion, the P/E-ratio is of interest because it is the most commonly used measurement 
to value a company. Furthermore, there exist contradicting views regarding how the variable 
impacts investors’ investment strategies.  
2.3.3. Firm Size Variable 
A firm’s size is a standardized and widely used variable that is believed to impact companies’ 
stock return (Fama & French, 1992). Firms differ greatly in size and the general perception is 
that larger firms are more stable compared to smaller firms, which are believed to be more 
sensitive to changes in the market (Chan & Chen, 1991). 
According to Fama & French (1992) the firm size is a proxy for financial distress and 
consequently a measure of a firm’s risk. The theory is that the observed higher returns for 
small firms should be considered compensation for additional risk, not included in the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM). Given the fact that the additional return is a consequence of 
higher risk this also implies that smaller firms are more volatile than larger firms (Fama & 
French, 1992). Hence, under this scenario the firm size should negatively impact the size of 
the asymmetric volatility, meaning that smaller firms are more prone to the leverage effect. 
This is in line with Cheung & Ng (1992) that studied the leverage effect for 251 companies 
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during the period 1962 to 1989. Their findings showed that smaller firms have larger 
asymmetric volatility compared with larger firms.  
Despite the general view that smaller firms are riskier, there exist contradicting perceptions. 
Piotroski & Roulstone (2004) showed that larger firms get more media attention and are 
subject to a more continuous examination compared to smaller firms, decreasing the 
information asymmetry between the market and larger firms (Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). 
Less information asymmetry means that larger firms will be subject to an increased trading 
and liquidity as investors react to news (Weigand, 1996; Ciner, 2003), which can increase 
larger firms’ sensitivity for volatility asymmetry. This is in line with Voogd & Geschiere 
(2015) that found a significant positive relationship between a firm’s size and the leverage 
effect, indicating that larger firms are more impacted by the leverage effect than smaller 
firms.  
In conclusion, several theories argue for the importance of a firm’s size regarding the total 
risk of the company. The perceived differences between small and large firms make the firm 
size variable an interesting explanatory variable when looking at the relationship with the 
leverage effect. 
2.3.4. Net Profit Margin  
The net profit margin (NPM) is a ratio of net profits as a percentage of total revenues for a 
company. The ratio is widely used as an indicator of a company’s financial health and it is 
calculated using the below formula (Damodaran, 2006): 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
 
 
(17) 
 
More generally the margin show what percentage of a company’s revenues that are converted 
into profit, i.e. how much a company has to spend in order to earn one dollar. A high ratio 
could indicate an efficient business model with a low-cost ratio and the contrary for a low 
NPM (Damodaran, 2006). If the NPM variable would yield a significant impact on the size of 
the leverage effect then there are two different scenarios that might explain the relationship.  
According to Qualls (1974) companies will not be able to maintain a high NPM over time. 
The margin should convert down to zero over time, assuming perfect market competition, 
thus making companies with a high NPM more sensitive to the leverage effect. This is in line 
with previous research that found a positive relationship between the NPM and the leverage 
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effect (Voogd & Geschiere, 2015). However, the presence of market imperfections e.g. 
monopoly, entry berries, could inhibit this theory as companies are able to maintain a high 
NPM over time (Qualls, 1974).   
The contradicting view is that since companies with a high NPM display a good profitability, 
this could make them less sensitive towards volatility asymmetry. Negative shocks are likely 
to have a smaller impact since investors know that the company is financially healthy. On the 
other hand, there could be distress costs associated with companies that have a low ratio, 
making investor’s more prone to sell of their shares in the case of a negative shock (Andrade 
& Kaplan, 1998). 
In conclusion, the NPM is a financial ratio that is often used as an indicator of a company’s 
financial health. The margin is widely known by investors and thereby makes an interesting 
explanatory variable. 
2.3.5. Industry Variable 
Newer established companies are often heterogeneous (not alike) regarding the organization, 
capital structure, and business model compared to the competitors in the same industry. After 
time, the company will adapt to its competitors, a process that is called isomorphism, creating 
a more homogenous (alike) industry (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The reason why a company 
undergoes an isomorphism can be of competition, regulation control or that the firm mimics 
the leading companies in the industry (Scott, 2008; Deegan & Underman, 2011).  
Because companies in an industry are homogenous they often share the same risk perception, 
business model, etc. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), which makes industry an interesting 
variable to study considering the leverage effect.  
According to MacKay & Philips (2005) industry factors influence the financial capital 
structure of a firm. Industries that have a relative high leverage can be expected to have an 
increased asymmetric volatility due to the distress cost compared to industries with relative 
low leverage (following the same logic as the debt-to-equity ratio). The hypothesis for this is 
that negative shocks in stock price for companies in a risky industry can make investors 
uncertain, which increases the trades due to risk aversion (Shefrin, 2007; Hibbert et al, 2008). 
Furthermore, other industry specific risks can make investors doubt the future of the 
company. Threats such as changing technology or consumer preferences can affect the 
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perception of the future competitiveness for an industry (Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999). 
Investors can view negative shocks in an industry that is heavily affected by outside threats as 
a signal that companies within the industry aren’t going to perform well in the future 
(Damodaran, 2006). This might increase investor’s uncertainty and hence trades and 
volatility, which in turn affects the leverage effect.   
The asymmetric volatility might also be affected by an investment strategy. If the stock price 
goes down in an industry that at the time is considered “hot” investors might feel that they can 
buy the stock cheap and sell it for more in the future (Byström, 2014).   
In conclusion, industry as an explanatory variable will show how the leverage effect is 
distributed in different industries. Expectations are that the leverage effect should be larger in 
industries that are considerate riskier due to industry specific factors.   
2.3.6. EV-to-EBITDA Multiple  
The EV-to-EBITDA multiple is one of the most common and within financial sector preferred 
multiples, used to determine the value of a company (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). Unlike many 
other financial multiples, the EV-to-EBITDA multiple contains debt. Including debt in the 
calculations is believed to give a more accurate valuation (Koller et al, 2015). Despite being 
more accurate, the ratio is not as extensively used as the P/E-ratio (Koller et al, 2015). 
The multiple is calculated using the below stated formula (Fraser & Ormistion, 2013): 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 =
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
 
 
 
(18) 
 
The multiple is believed to contain information about investors’ future expectations, with a 
higher multiple indicating higher expectations regarding future earnings. On the contrary, a 
low multiple can be a sign of a company in distress or of a mature business model with stable 
earnings but with limited future upside (Koller et al, 2015).   
The value driver form for the multiple is stated below (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014): 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 =  
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡=1 (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
 
 
(19) 
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The value driver equation shows that there are several variables that impact the total value of 
the company. Changes in earnings (NOPLAT), growth (g) or the discount factor (WACC) 
will all affect the final output value (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). 
A connection between the EV-to-EBITDA multiple and the leverage effect is that since many 
investors (especially institutionally investors) buy stocks based on the valuation given by the 
EV-to-EBITDA multiple, a change in the multiple is likely to impact their investment 
decision. This theory is in line with the expectations for the P/E-ratio. For example, if 
expected future earnings are not realized investor’s might chose to sell of their share, thus 
making firms with a high multiple more sensitive to volatility asymmetry (Shefrin, 2007).  
Furthermore, under perfect market conditions companies with a high multiple will convert 
down over time, given the assumption that the market is aware of the overvaluation. This 
will increase the reaction to negative shocks for companies with a high multiple, compared 
to companies that are valued in line with the market average (Lakonishok et al, 1994). 
Therefore, it is expected that companies with a high multiple will be more affected by the 
leverage effect.  
 
However, an argument against the connection is that the EV-to-EBITDA multiple is not as 
popular as the P/E-ratio (Koller et al, 2015). Investors might therefore not take the multiple 
into consideration when investing in stocks, which would suggest that there is no relationship 
between the multiple and the leverage effect.  
In conclusion, the EV-to-EBITDA is a preferred multiple within the financial sector. The 
perceived benefits of the EV-to-EBITDA multiple compared to the more generally used P/E-
ratio, making it interesting to include both as explanatory variables.  
2.3.7. Beta Variable 
The beta of a company is a risk measure that shows the level of systematic risk for the 
company (Danthine & Donaldson, 2014). The beta variable is calculated using the below 
formula: 
𝛽 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚)
 
 
 
(20) 
 
The numerator is the covariance between the stock and the market, while the denominator is 
the variance of the market. The stock is considered risk neutral if the beta equals one, which 
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means that the stock exactly follows the movements of the market. A beta higher than one 
indicates that the stock moves more volatile and with higher up-downside than the market, 
representing a larger risk. Companies with a beta below one is a less correlated with the 
market or a less volatile, lowering the associated risk (Byström, 2014). 
The beta is used in several theoretical models, the most famous being the CAPM, stated 
below:  
𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑚(𝐸[𝑅𝑚] − 𝑅𝑓) (21) 
 
The CAPM model clearly shows that a β > 1 increases the expected return because investors 
want to be compensated for the additional risk (Danthine & Donaldson, 2014). Companies 
that have a relative high beta are thus anticipated to provide an expected return that is 
sufficient to cover for the high systematic risk (Danthine & Donaldson, 2014). These 
companies might therefore be affected by the leverage effect more compared to companies 
with a lower beta. This relation might happen because investors are keen to take the 
systematic risk into consideration (Grable, Lytton & O’Neill, 2004), and when a negative 
shock occurs, it might make investors think that the stock (which has a high systematic risk) is 
too risky.  
However, the concept and applicability about CAPM stating that beta is affecting the 
expected excess return have been disputed (Jensen, Black & Scholes, 1972; Fama & 
MacBeth, 1973). The fact remains that beta is still an important financial risk measurement 
for stocks.  
A lower beta indicates less risk for a stock, which can be used in portfolios to lower and 
downgrade the total risk (Korn & Kuntz, 2016). Stocks that have low betas might therefore 
have increased negative asymmetric volatility, meaning that positive shocks can provide more 
volatility. The argument is that these stocks are also anticipated to have a low expected return, 
due to the smaller risk. Investors might therefore trade more volatile when a positive shock 
inflicts a low beta stock, because this might indicate that the extended return can be higher i.e. 
low risk but presumably higher expected return.   
In conclusion, beta is a well-known financial risk measurement used both in the real world 
and in the research field. A believed relationship is that higher systematic risk leads to larger 
asymmetric volatility.   
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2.3.8. Dividend Yield 
The last potential contributing factor is the dividend yield. The variable is a financial ratio that 
measures how much a company is paying out to its shareholders each year in the form of 
dividend in relation to its stock price. In the absence of capital gains, the entire value gain for 
investors will be generated by the dividend payouts (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014).  
The ratio is calculated using the below formula (Koller et al, 2015): 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
 
 
 
(22) 
A high ratio could be an indication of a company being undervalued in relation to its earnings. 
On the contrary, a company paying little or no dividend can be an indication of overvaluation 
or that the company is in a growth stage (Fraser & Ormistion, 2013). The payout policy varies 
between companies; mature companies are likely to have a higher dividend yield compared to 
companies with more investment opportunities (Koller et al, 2015). 
There are two potential theories that could explain the variables relationship with the leverage 
effect if the variable is deemed significant in impacting the size of the leverage effect.  
Companies with a high dividend yield are believed to be more stable compared to companies 
with low or no dividend payments. The dividend is believed to act as a cushion towards 
negative shocks (Gwilym, Morgan, & Thomas, 2000), which might decrease the sensitivity to 
the leverage effect for companies with a high dividend yield.  
In a similar manner, the dividend strategy is a common strategy used by investors to combine 
a portfolio of investments. The focus of the strategy is on dividend payments, compared with 
the normal focus of capital gains (Shou, 2014). This means that companies with a high 
dividend yield could be less impacted by volatility asymmetry since investors do not react as 
heavily to shocks that do not impact the dividend. However, many companies have 
historically been forced to cut their dividend during times of financial downturns. Under this 
scenario, the leverage effect and the dividend yield should be positively correlated, as 
investors’ react to the change in dividend policy (Broberg & Lindh, 2012). 
In conclusion, the dividend yield is of interest since it is an alternative way for investors to 
obtain returns on their investment compared to the more focused area of capital gains.  
18 
 
3. Data 
The chapter describes the data used to answer the research questions stated in section 1.1. 
This includes a thorough description of the collection and screening of the data as well as an 
explanation of the requirements applied to the data.    
3.1. Data Collection and Screening  
The study is conducted on U.S. companies active on NASDAQ or the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) between 1996 and 2015. U.S. data is used because this topic has not been 
conducted on U.S. data previously and it is considered the preferred data when conducting 
economic research (Ryan et al, 2002).  
The requirements set up for a company to be included in the sample are the following: 
1. Active on NASDAQ or NYSE.  
2. Active during the whole research period; 1996-01-02 to 2015-12-30.  
The 20-year research period allows for the capturing of the changes in asymmetric volatility 
over time and is long enough to include different economic conditions and events (e.g. IT-
bubble, the financial crisis of 2008). Furthermore, the requirement that companies most have 
been active during the whole research period ensures a balanced panel data. Balanced panel 
data makes it possible to observe the same unit for every time period, minimizing the noise 
introduced by unit heterogeneity (Hayashi, 2000). The use of balanced panel data is also 
consistent with the previous study by Voogd & Geschiere (2015). 
All necessary data were retrieved from the database DataStream. The collected data is stated 
below (variable code name in brackets): 
• Stock Prices (P) 
• S&P500INDEX (S&PCOMP) 
• Debt-to-Equity (WC08231) 
• P/E-ratio (PE) 
• Enterprise Value (WC18100) 
• Net Profit Margin (WC08366) 
• SIC code 1 (WC07021) 
• EBITDA (WC18198) 
• Dividend yield (DY) 
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Retrieving all necessary data from DataStream ensures a consistent assortment. The use of 
different databases could lead to missing values or mismatches if the databases do not 
perfectly correspond with each other (Ulbricht & Weiner, 2005). 
The gathering process was conducted in line with the requirements. First, all active companies 
on NASDAQ and NYSE were retrieved for the last trading date of 2015, which provided an 
original sample of 4,215 companies (2,438 from NASDAQ and 1,777 from NYSE). 
Thereafter, 2,904 companies were excluded since they did not fulfill the second requirement 
(1,810 from NASDAQ and 1,094 from NYSE). The final sample consists of 1,311 companies, 
which is large enough to conduct significant research on (Denscombe, 2009).  
A disadvantage with the second requirement is that it excludes a relative large number of the 
companies from the original sample. The sample is consequently less able to capture short-
lived and more recently established companies. If this paper would not adhere to the second 
requirement, the sample would have been more diversified with a higher percentage of newer 
established companies and defaulted companies. However, this would have yielded 
unbalanced panel data and the number of companies would have increased greatly. Both 
conditions would have made it hard to implement the research in practice, given the relative 
short time-frame of this thesis (Dahmström, 2011).   
3.1.1. Stock Prices  
The stock prices for each company were obtained on a daily basis for each trading day in the 
research period. This yielded 5,219 observations for each company and a total of 6,842,109 
observations for the entire sample. Daily data is considered high frequency inputs which 
provide good volatility estimates, resulting in better estimations of the asymmetric volatility 
(Hayashi, 2000).  
The stock prices had to be converted into log returns in order to be applicable in the GJR-
GARCH and EGARCH models. Log returns are continuously compounded returns, log (1 +
𝑟) ≈ 𝑟 (Campbell et al, 1998). 
The stock prices were converted into log returns using the below equation (Danthine & 
Donaldson, 2014):  
  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 = ln (
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
)    (23) 
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3.1.2. Firm Specific Variables 
The firm specific variables were obtained on a yearly basis for each year in the research 
period, 1996 to 2015.  
DataStream provides the values directly for the following variables; debt-to-equity, P/E-ratio, 
firm size, NPM, industry and dividend yield. By obtaining the values directly from 
DataStream, the risk of miscalculations is removed (Denscombe, 2009). The two variables not 
given directly by DataStream are the EV-to-EBITDA multiple and the beta variable. These 
variables had to be calculated manually using the retrieved underlying values from 
DataStream. The EV-to-EBITDA multiple was calculated using equation 18, stated in 
subsection 2.3.6. The beta variable was calculated using equation 20 in subsection 2.3.7, with 
the S&P500 as the market variable. The beta was calculated using two-years daily returns 
(approximately 522 observations), ten betas for each company is therefore estimated; see 
section 4.2 that explains why a two-year period is used.  
Furthermore, one adjustment that had to be made to the variables was to log the firm size. 
This was done due to the large differences in size between the firms. By taking the log of the 
firm size it is possible to in a straightforward manner assess how a one percent change in the 
variable impacts the leverage effect when interpreting the panel data model (Hayashi, 2000). 
The number of missing values differs between the firm specific variables, but none of the 
variables have enough missing values to distort the result (Dahmström, 2011). The descriptive 
statistic in table 1 below shows that the number of observations varies from 11,339 to 13,110 
for the variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistic for the firm specific variables 
Variables D/E P/E Firm Size3 NPM EV/EBITDA Beta Dividend 
Mean 73 24.38 10444843 -133.2 2.3 0.847 1.63 
Median 45.01 18.4 1109529 5.91 9.07 0.836 0.82 
Std.Dev 88.4 20.54 42409359 3930.48 525.07 0.52 2.35 
Skewness 2.19 3.22 10.34 -52.09 -75.95 0.314 3.42 
Kurtosis 8.84 16.34 142.87 3113.26 6183.2 3.21 29.81 
Jerque-Bera 27446 103790 10698615 5.18E+09 1.97E+10 241.5 418127.6 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 12304 11339 12842 12845 12395 13110 13101 
 
                                                          
3 In thousands USD 
21 
 
The table further shows that the Jerque-Bera probability is 0.00 for all variables, meaning that 
the hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected (Brooks, 2014). In a similar manner, the 
kurtosis for the variables is quite high, indicating that there are fat tails present in the data. 
Only the beta variable is close to the normal kurtosis of three (Hayashi, 2000).  
 
Finally, the standard deviation for the variables is quite high. This is no surprise given the 
high spread between the mean and the median (Dahmström, 2011). The high standard 
deviation in the spread of the explanatory variables creates a larger possibility to estimate 
interesting findings (Denscombe, 2009).  
4. Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology for the estimation of the asymmetric volatility and the 
firm specific variables as well as the approach for choosing the most sufficient panel data 
regressions. Strengths and weaknesses regarding the research validity are discussed at the end 
of the chapter.  
4.1. Method for Estimation of Asymmetric Volatility  
This thesis applies two commonly used models to estimate the asymmetric volatility; the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) and the EGARCH(1,1). The models are related and should yield 
equivalent results, which therefore make result concerning the estimation of asymmetric 
volatility more robust (Hayashi, 2000; Dahmström, 2011). Voogd & Geschiere (2015) only 
used the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model, hence the reliability of this thesis is considered higher.  
The models are estimated using the economic program EViews. The program has both models 
pre-programmed and they are estimated with a normal distribution, making the estimation 
process straightforward. The only required input is the log returns, as stated in section 3.1.1. 
EViews provides the size of the asymmetric volatility in a coherent table (see appendix A). A 
larger size of the coefficient implies a higher asymmetric volatility (Brooks, 2014).  
Each regression for the GJR-GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) models is estimated using a 
two-year time period with the log returns. A one-year period could generate erroneous results 
due to lack of information (Rachev et al, 2007). The 20-year time-frame and the use of two–
year periods resulted in a total of 26,220 regressions (10 periods x 1,311 companies; 13,110 
each for GJR-GARCH and EGARCH). This can be compared to the previous study that used 
approximately 1,900 observations of asymmetric volatility (Voogd & Geschiere, 2015).  
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In order to estimate the large number of regressions efficiently a loop was developed in 
EViews. The loop automatically estimated all regressions and then transported the values into 
Excel. A manual estimation would have been very time consuming and also increased the risk 
of manual errors (Dahmström, 2011).  
4.2. Method for the Firm Specific Variables  
The firm specific variables are calculated into two-year average values to match with the 
asymmetric volatility that was estimated using two-year periods. This ensures that the panel 
data regressions are more consistent regarding representing the true values for each time-
frame.  For example, the first period consists of the first two-years in the research period, i.e. 
1996-1997. Furthermore, table 1 in appendix B show that the firm variables varies over time, 
an average value could therefore be more efficient in capturing the true values (Denscombe, 
2009). Voogd & Geschiere (2015) did not use an average value; instead they used the value 
for the final trading date between two-years. Hence, they allowed for a single point estimation 
to be representative for a two-year period, leading to a potential biased interpretation of the 
true values (Denscombe, 2009).  
Another adjustment was to exclude values for each variable that was below or above the 99th 
percentile. This was done in order to make the result less affected by extreme values  
(Dahmström, 2011).  
Table 2 below shows the correlation between each firm specific variable (excluding the 
industry variable which is estimated with dummies). No variables are considered highly 
correlated (correlation over 0.80), meaning that the data sample is not affected by 
multicollinearity (Brooks, 2014).   
Table 2: Correlation matrix for the firm specific variables 
 D/E P/E Firm size NPM EV/EBITDA Beta Dividend 
D/E 1       
P/E -0.040 1      
Firm size 0.173 -0.010 1     
NPM 0.017 0.004 0.008 1    
EV/EBITDA 0.014 0.029 0.007 0.004 1   
Beta -0.048 0.131 0.008 0.019 0.003 1  
Dividend 0.271 -0.116 0.043 0.030 0.003 -0.188 1 
 
4.3. Panel Data Models 
The panel data regressions are used to determine if the explanatory variables (the firm specific 
variables) affect the dependent variable (the leverage effect i.e. asymmetric volatility). Panel 
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data is a combination of time-series and cross-sectional dimensions that allow data to be 
analyzed in both dimensions (Brooks, 2014). Panel data models are therefore highly efficient 
in capturing information compared to using a normal time-series or cross-section regression 
(Rachev et al, 2007). The panel data is conducted with the asymmetric volatility from the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) in order to evaluate if the results will depend on the 
estimation of the leverage effect. 
The panel data model used in this thesis is stated below in equation 24; table 2 in appendix B 
show an example of the structure of the panel data in excel.   
𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖,𝑡(
𝐷
𝐸⁄ )𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖,𝑡(
𝑃
𝐸⁄ )𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖,𝑡(𝐸𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖,𝑡(𝑁𝑃𝑀)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖,𝑡(𝑖𝑛𝑑)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑖,𝑡(
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴⁄ )𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖,𝑡(𝛽)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑖,𝑡(𝐷𝑖𝑣)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(24) 
 
The panel data model can be estimated using three different models; the fixed effects model, 
the random effects model or the pooled regression model. To determine which of the fixed or 
random effect models that are the most sufficient to use, the redundant fixed effects test and 
the Hausman test is applied (Brooks, 2014). The pooled regression can be estimated 
regardless of the outcome of these tests. 
4.3.1. Random Effects Model 
The random effects model is considered superior to the fixed effects model since the model 
uses fewer parameters and hence requires less estimation and thereby saves degrees of 
freedom (Brooks, 2014). However, a drawback with the model is that the underlying 
assumptions are stricter. Under the assumption that  𝜇𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are independent of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 it will 
require that the composite error term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 are independent of all the 𝑥′s. This prevents the 
parameters from being biased and inconsistent (Brooks, 2014).  
The below formulas state the random effects model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (25) 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  (26) 
 
The intercept (𝛼) is estimated to be the same for all units in the cross-sectional dimension 
over time. The variable ∈𝑖 is able to vary in the cross-sectional dimension and the meaning of 
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the variable is to measure the deviation of each entity’s intercept term around 𝛼 (Brooks, 
2014).  
4.3.2. Fixed Effects Model 
The idea behind the fixed effects model is that some parameters are fixed in one or both of the 
parameters (Hayashi, 2000). The equation for fixed effects in cross-section is stated below:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  (27) 
 
The term 𝜇𝑖 is used to encapsulate every variable that affects 𝑦𝑖𝑡 in the cross-section 
dimension but don’t vary over time (Brooks, 2014). The model can be estimated using 
dummy variables, see equation 28 below:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝐷1𝑖 + 𝜇2𝐷2𝑖 + 𝜇3𝐷3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝜇𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
(28) 
 
This equation is known as the least squares dummy variable approach (LSDV). The D1 is a 
dummy variable for all observations in the first firm (Brooks, 2014). This model therefore 
restricts the use of using industry dummy variables (Hayashi, 2000).  
There are also panel data models that allow fixed effects to exist in the period dimension. See 
the equation below: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
(29) 
 
The variable 𝜆𝑡 is the intercept for the time, making it possible to capture every variable that 
affects 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and also varies over time but is constant in the cross-sectional dimension. The 
period-fixed effect model also uses dummies in the same way as equation 28, with the one 
difference that dummies in the period-fixed effects capture time variation instead (Brooks, 
2014).  
See equation below for the LSDV for period-fixed effects, D1 is a dummy variable for the 
first time period, etc.: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1𝐷1𝑖 + 𝜆2𝐷2𝑖 + 𝜆3𝐷3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝜆𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖 
 
(30) 
 
Fixed effects in both the cross-section and period can be applied, which can be called two-
way error component model. The model combines equation 28 and 30 and can therefore be 
written as stated below:  
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝐷1𝑖 + 𝜇2𝐷2𝑖 + 𝜇3𝐷3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝜇𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖 + 𝜆2𝐷2𝑖 + 𝜆3𝐷3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝜆𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖 
 
(31) 
 
4.3.3. Deciding Between Fixed and Random Effects 
The choice between the random and fixed effects is done by applying the redundant fixed 
effects test and the Hausman significant test, as stated in subsection 4.3.  
The redundant fixed effect test show if the panel data model can use random effects in the 
period or the cross-sectional dimension. If the p-value is lower than 5%, the model is rejected 
and it is more sufficient to use the fixed effects model (Brooks, 2014).  
In a similar manner, the Hausman specification test is a test for endogeneity in the error term 
and it is used to determine if the random effects model is applicable to the panel data. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no existence of endogeneity, making it possible to apply the random 
effects model. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effects model should be used 
(Rachev et al, 2007). The test can be performed in EViews, using the pre-programed function 
with a 𝑥2(𝑘) statistic (Brooks, 2014).  
4.4. Research Validity  
The reliability of the research approach is believed to be high. First and foremost, the large 
sample consisting of 1,311 companies and 13,110 observations for each firm variable in the 
panel data is above the acceptable level. A sample larger than 300 observations is considered 
to provide a reliable estimation of the results (Denscombe, 2009). Secondly, the 20-year time 
period is long enough to capture the changes in asymmetric volatility over time during 
different time periods and reduces the risk of a biased result (Denscombe, 2009).  
Moreover, the use of two different models to estimate the asymmetric volatility (GJR-
GARCH and EGARCH) ensures robust and reliable results. This is also an improvement 
compared with the previous study that only applied the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model (Voogd & 
Geschiere, 2015).  
A weakness with the study is the exclusion of a relative large amount of companies from the 
original sample as a consequence of the second requirement. The sample is therefore less 
diversified and could be biased towards long-lived and stable companies. 
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5. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
This chapter presents the results regarding the asymmetric volatility estimations and the firm 
specific variables impact on the asymmetric volatility. The results are analyzed using the 
theoretical framework stipulated in chapter two. 
5.1. Results from the Asymmetric Volatility Estimations  
The asymmetric volatility estimations from the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model are presented in 
figure 1 below4. The figure is a histogram of the asymmetric volatility over time, allowing for 
an interpretation of the changes in the asymmetric volatility over time. Out of the total 13,110 
observations; 9,710 are yielded to be positive and 3,400 negative. The positive values 
represent that negative shocks increase the volatility more than positive shocks of equal size, 
and the contrary for negative values (following the interpretation for asymmetric volatility 
from GJR-GARCH, see section 2.2.2) (Dutta, 2014). See appendices C, D and E for more 
figures of the asymmetric volatility estimations.  
 Figure 1: Histogram showing the distribution of the asymmetric volatility over time 
 
 
The positive values become larger and increase in frequency during periods characterized by 
bad economic market condition. The number of positive values increases during the financial 
crisis 2008-2010 and on the contrary, there are fewer positive observations for the period 
                                                          
4 EGARCH(1,1) yielded approximately the same results and is presented in appendix E 
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2014-2015, as seen in figure 1. This would suggest that the market condition impacts the sign, 
frequency and size of the asymmetric volatility. The observation is in line with previous 
research that found that the leverage effect is greater during periods of increased economic 
distress (Voogd & Geschiere, 2015; Wu, 2015).  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the asymmetric volatility observations. The mean of 
the asymmetric volatility for the whole sample is 0.064, which is in line with similar research 
(Bekaert & Wu, 2000). Furthermore, the table shows that the kurtosis is approximately 9.11 
for the whole sample. This shows that there is a presence of fat tails in the data (Brooks, 
2014). The normal distribution is rejected when looking at the Jarque-Bera test, which shows 
that the normal distribution is clearly rejected with a p-value of 0.00 (Brooks, 2014).  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics over GJR-GARCH(1,1) asymmetric volatility 
Period Mean Median Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob. 
1996-1997 0.042 0.039 0.180 -0.086 9.293 2192.7 0.000 
1998-1999 0.062 0.063 0.179 -0.178 9.167 2102.1 0.000 
2000-2001 0.058 0.060 0.168 -0.316 8.553 1720.4 0.000 
2002-2003 0.080 0.076 0.170 0.091 8.910 1939.2 0.000 
2004-2005 0.053 0.051 0.194 -0.026 8.436 1614.2 0.000 
2006-2007 0.040 0.050 0.194 -0.269 8.765 1841.0 0.000 
2008-2009 0.086 0.088 0.121 -0.726 15.949 9437.5 0.000 
2010-2011 0.107 0.112 0.149 -0.864 11.067 3760.8 0.000 
2012-2013 0.052 0.047 0.200 0.058 7.956 1349.5 0.000 
2014-2015 0.068 0.073 0.219 -0.493 7.337 1086.5 0.000 
Total 0.064 0.068 0.180 -0.285 9.149 20624.1 0.000 
 
In contrast to the leverage effect, the standard deviation is higher during times of good 
economic condition (see table 3), given that there are more observations of negative 
asymmetric volatility. Making the sample more outspread and increasing the tail of the 
negative side. This can be more clearly observed by looking at figure 5 in appendix D and E, 
which only displays the negative asymmetric volatility values.  
5.2. Selecting the most Sufficient Panel Data Model 
In line with the information stated in section 4.3, the choice between the fixed and random 
effects models are done by applying the redundant fixed effects test and the Hausman 
significant test (Brooks, 2014).  
The redundant fixed effect test is applied two times; first to test for fixed effect in the cross-
sectional dimension and then to test for fixed effects in the period dimension. The test 
provides a p-value below 5% for both dimensions, see table 4 and 5 below and appendix F for 
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EGARCH(1,1). Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and hence it is more sufficient to use 
the fixed effects model than the random effects model (Hayashi, 2000).  
Table 4: Redundant fixed effect test in cross-sectional dimension for GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
 Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 1.076375 (1271.9029) 0.0389 
Cross-section Chi-square 1454.2798 1271 0.0002 
 
Table 5: Redundant fixed effect test in period dimension for GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
 Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Period F 16.93339 (9.10291) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 151.532527 9 0.0000 
 
The use of the fixed effects as the most appropriate panel data model is strengthening by the 
Hausman test, which also rejects the use of the random effects model (see appendix F).  
Given the rejection of the random effects model, the fixed effects model is used along sides 
the pooled regression. The following five panel data models are estimated for the dataset, see 
appendix G and H:  
• Pooled regression. 
• Pooled regression with industry dummies. 
• Panel regression with fixed effects in cross-section. 
• Panel regression with fixed effects in period. 
• Panel regression with fixed effects in both the cross-section and period dimension. 
The use of five panel data models increases the reliability of the data as well as provides 
interesting results for comparison. The regression with fixed effects in both dimensions 
provides the most reliable result, if a variable is significant in this model it is deemed as a 
strong result (see equation 31). However, the model can be too restrictive since it losses 
variance in the parameters, which could result in significant results being rejected (Brooks, 
2014).  
5.3. Results from the Panel Data Models 
The ten panel data regressions (five for GJR-GARCH(1,1) and five for EGARCH(1,1)) yields 
roughly the same results for all firm specific variables, see appendix G and H. Two variables 
are significant in every regression, the firm size and the beta variable. The NPM variable is 
significant in three regressions. However, it is insignificant in regressions that use fixed effect 
in the cross-sectional dimension.  
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The results for the panel data regression with fixed effects in both dimensions are provided 
below, see table 6 and 7. 
The results from GJR-GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) are consistent with each other, both 
reject and accept the same variables. Since both models yield approximately the same result, 
it provides robust results concerning the measurement of the asymmetric volatility. 
Differences between the models are mostly the probabilities and the estimated impact from 
the coefficients, which can be expected since they do not measure the asymmetric volatility 
exactly the same (Brooks, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1. Debt-to-Equity Ratio   
The debt-to-equity variable is insignificant in all five regressions, and the p-value is between 
0.39 to 0.86. This means that a firm’s capital structure does not impact the leverage effect. 
The result contradicts the conclusions from several authors who concluded that financial 
leverage is the cause or impacts the leverage effect (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982). However, 
the result is in line with later research, which has found the variable to be insignificant in 
impacting the size of the leverage effect (Figlewski & Wang, 2000; Hasanhodzic & Lo, 2013; 
Voogd & Geschiere, 2015).  
Table 6: GJR-GARCH(1,1), fixed in both dimensions panel data regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.19403 0.04713 -4.1164 0.0000 
D/E 3.10E-05 6.64E-05 0.8500 0.3953 
P/E 6.21E-07 0.00010 0.0060 0.9952 
Log Firm size 0.01639 0.00338 4.8388 0.0000*** 
NPM -6.86E-06 9.26E-06 -0.7410 0.4587 
EV/EBITDA 5.12E-06 1.80E-05 0.2845 0.7760 
Beta 0.03468 0.00593 5.8435 0.0000*** 
Dividend -0.0008 0.00149 -0.5940 0.5525 
Significant at the *10% level; **5% level; ***1% level 
 
Table 7: EGARCH(1,1) model, fixed in both dimensions panel data regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.166780 0.029905 -5.577021 0.0000 
D/E -3.58E-05 2.30E-05 -1.553874 0.1202 
P/E 1.90E-05 6.49E-05 0.292077 0.7702 
Log Firm size 0.014111 0.002152 6.557983 0.0000*** 
NPM -1.24E-06 5.84E-06 -0.212891 0.8314 
EV/EBITDA 1.20E-07 1.15E-05 0.010443 0.9917 
Beta 0.020895 0.003772 5.539792 0.0000*** 
Dividend -0.000537 0.000948 -0.566524 0.5711 
Significant at the *10% level; **5% level; ***1% level 
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Modigliani & Miller (1958) argues that the distress cost makes investors concerned when the 
debt-to-equity ratio gets too high, which Black (1976) claims might be the cause for the 
leverage effect. Therefore, it can be reasoned that the negative shocks that happen to a stock 
are not large enough to make investors worried about the raising distress cost, hence is the 
debt-to-equity ratio insignificant.   
The sign of the coefficient5 is in all regressions estimated to be positive, which suggest that 
the debt-to-equity would to some extent increase the leverage effect if it would be significant. 
This contradicts the results from Voogd & Geschiere (2015), who estimated a negative 
relationship (higher debt decreases the leverage effect). The fact that a higher debt-to-equity 
ratio would decrease the sensitive to shocks seems perplexing and the result found in this 
paper is according to the authors more robust and in line with theories.  
5.3.2. Price-Earnings Multiple  
The P/E-ratio is insignificant with a p-value above the 10% significance level for all 
regressions. The results show that firms with a high P/E-ratio are not more sensitive to larger 
asymmetric volatility, even though those firms have a relative high future growth expectations 
built into the valuation (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). This finding could therefore indicate that 
investors are confident in their investment strategy regarding the future payoff for stocks with 
a high P/E-ratio. This confidence can make investors uncaring regarding negative shocks for a 
stock, since they are convinced that their future expectations will be realized (Dreman & 
Berry, 1995; La Porta et al, 1997).  
The findings in this paper contradict the results from Voogd & Geschiere (2015), who found a 
significantly positive relationship between the P/E-ratio and the leverage effect. However, the 
coefficient is positive in both studies, indicating that the overvaluation theories and the 
uncertainty regarding future growth might be plausible. Because the P/E-ratio is insignificant 
in the U.S. market, it might indicate that investors in U.S. don’t take the P/E-valuation into 
consideration to the same extent as the Europeans.   
5.3.3. Firm Size Variable  
The firm size is significant in all panel data regressions, with a p-value close to 0.00, see 
appendix G and H. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that a firm’s size 
                                                          
5 All coefficients stated in this chapter refers to the results from the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model with fixed effects 
in both dimension, see table 6.  
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impacts the leverage effect. Given the fact that the variable is significant in all regressions the 
results are robust (Brooks, 2014).  
The sign of the coefficient is positive with a value corresponding to 0.0164, the second largest 
positive coefficient of all the variables. This means that larger firms are more sensitive to the 
leverage effect than smaller firms; a one percent increase in firm size (log EV) would hence 
correspond to an increase in the leverage effect by 0.0164 units.  
The positive sign of the coefficient is surprising, given the general perception that smaller 
firms are more volatile and should thereby be more prone to the leverage effect. The result 
contradicts the findings by Cheung & Ng (1992), who found that smaller firms are more 
affected by the leverage effect. However, the result is in line with the previous study by 
Voogd & Geschiere (2015), strengthening the validity. A possible explanation could be that 
there is less information asymmetry between the market and larger firms compared to smaller 
firms (Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). Less information asymmetry increases the trading 
volume which in turn could make larger firms more affected by negative shocks and hence 
more prone to the leverage effect.  
5.3.4. Net Profit Margin  
The NPM is significant for all regressions except those with fixed effects in the cross-
sectional dimension. This means that it is not possible to conclude that the NPM impacts the 
leverage effect, but it can’t be strongly rejected (Brooks, 2014). The previous research found 
significance for the variable, suggesting that the fixed effects regression is too restricted in 
this case (Voogd & Geschiere, 2015).  
The small negative coefficient of -6.86E-06 is partly in line with the theoretical framework. 
Companies with a good ability to generate bottom-line results are likely to be more resistant 
towards negative shocks, compared with companies that have a higher cost structure (Andrade 
& Kaplan, 1998). Therefore, the finding that a higher NPM lowers the size of the leverage 
effect could be explained by the increase in investors confident resulting from a higher 
margin.  
Voogd & Geschiere (2015) estimated the opposite coefficient sign in their study, a fact they 
explained by the theory that the NPM should convert down over time given perfect market 
competition. However, an argument against this finding is the existence of market 
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imperfections (e.g. entry berries, etc.), allowing companies to maintain a high NPM over time 
(Qualls, 1974).  
5.3.5. Industry Variable  
The industry variable is estimated through dummy variables, making it impossible to estimate 
panel data regression that uses fixed effects with the industry variable (Brooks, 2014). 
Therefore, the industry variable is only used in the pooled regressions that use dummies (see 
appendix G and H). The regressions capture everything that is different between the 
industries, making it hard to interpret the true relation between industries and the leverage 
effect (Brooks, 2014).  
The pooled regressions with all industry dummies shows that only agriculture is significant, 
thus concluding that no difference between the other industries can be found.  
Appendix I have two figures that show the average asymmetric volatility for each industry for 
both the whole sample period and divided into two-year periods. Figure 1 (see appendix I) 
show that agriculture is mostly on average a negative asymmetric volatility (positive shocks 
increase asymmetric volatility more), only the construction industry also displayed in the 
years 2002-2003 a negative value. This is an interesting observation because agriculture was 
the only industry that is significant in the regressions.  
Figure 2 in appendix I shows that almost every industry has similar reaction regarding the 
average asymmetric volatility. The argument from section 2.3.5 that some industries might be 
affected more from the leverage effect seems therefore not so probable because the average 
leverage effect is almost the same throughout the time-frame. If an industry would be more 
affected by the leverage effect it is expected that it would show a large deviation in the 
average asymmetric volatility and therefore be captured in figure 2 in appendix I. There is no 
large deviation in figure 2 (except for agriculture), leading to a conclusion that the leverage 
effect is roughly the same for each industry. However, this is just a conclusion based on the 
graphs and not by data results; the validity of this conclusion should therefore be taken into 
consideration.   
5.3.6. EV-to-EBITDA Multiple 
The EV-to-EBITDA variable is insignificant with a p-value above the 10% acceptance level 
for all regressions. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected at all significance levels, meaning 
that the multiple does not affect the size of the asymmetric volatility. The results for the EV-
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to-EBITDA multiple is in line with the findings for the P/E-ratio in this paper, which is 
intuitive since both variables are measurements of a company’s value in relation to its 
earnings.  
The sign of the coefficient is positive and amounts to 5.12E-06, which is close to zero. The 
finding is in line with the theoretical framework. A high multiple should convert down over 
time, either because of increasing market competition or because investor’s future 
expectations are not realized (Lakonishok et al, 1994; Shefrin, 2007). Both theories indicate 
that a higher multiple will make companies more prone to the leverage effect. 
5.3.7. Beta Variable 
The beta is the second significant variable, with a p-value close to zero. The variable is 
significant in every panel data regression, making it reliable as an explanatory variable for the 
size of the leverage effect (Brooks, 2014).  
The sign of the coefficient is positive and amounts to approximately 0.034, thus concluding 
that a higher beta impacts the leverage effect positively. The results indicate that stocks with a 
higher systematic risk are more prone to be affected by larger asymmetric volatility. This 
might be due to the fact that investors who hold stocks with a high systematic risk could feel 
unsure about the future payoff, associated with the high risk. This could therefore lead to 
more volatile trades when a negative shock occurs in a stock with a high beta since negative 
shocks might be attributed as a bad signal (Hibbert et al, 2008). 
Following the same argument, Grable et al, (2004) write that investors who hold investments 
in assets that are considered above the normal risk tend to be more anxious and worried about 
the movements of the asset. This strengthens the explanation of the positive relationship 
between beta and the leverage effect.  
5.3.8. Dividend Yield  
Finally, the dividend yield is insignificant with a p-value above the 10% significance level in 
all regressions. This means that the dividend yield does not explain the size of the leverage 
effect. The result might be explained by the fact that investors hold stocks with high dividend 
during a long-time period (Shou, 2014), investors therefore don’t react to shocks in the stock.  
The sign of the coefficient is negative with a value corresponding to -0.0008. This means that 
if the variable would have been significant, then a one percent increase in the dividend yield 
would have decreased the leverage effect by 0.0008 units. The result is in line with the 
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theoretical background. Companies with a relative high dividend yield are believed to be 
more mature and stable (Koller et al, 2015). The dividend is also believed to act as a cushion 
towards negative shocks (Shou, 2014). These two factors can thereby make firms with a high 
dividend yield more resistant to negative shocks and hence less prone to the leverage effect. 
5.4. Interpretation of the Model as a Whole    
Observing the models as a whole, there are several interesting observations that can be made. 
Table 8 below provides the R-squares for both panel data models. It is possible to determine 
that the R-square varies between the models. The pooled regressions have an R-square of 
0.028 for the GJR-GARCH and 0.048 for the EGARCH, indicating that the models only 
explain a small part of the total volatility asymmetry. In a practical sense this would mean that 
the panel data regression based on for example the GJR-GARCH(1,1) explains less than three 
percent of what influences the variance in size of the leverage effect. 
However, the R-squares increases in regressions with fixed effects in the cross-section 
dimension, indicating that firm specific variables in general determine a relative large part of 
the total size of the leverage effect. Thus, there are several firm variables that could be 
included in order to obtain a better fit for the model. The problem is that there exist numerous 
firm variables and some might not be possible to measure in practice.  
Furthermore, the difference in R-square between the fixed effects in cross-section and fixed 
effects in both dimensions indicate that it’s not time variables that in this case explains the 
leverage effect (Rachev et al, 2007). 
Table 8: R-square for all panel data regressions 
REGRESSIONS GJR-GARCH EGARCH 
Pooled regression 0.028487 0.048425 
Pooled regression with dummies 0.030860 0.050528 
Fixed regression in cross-section 0.156321 0.183298 
Fixed regression in period 0.042665 0.066049 
Fixed regression in both dimensions 0.170233 0.200869 
 
To conclude, the model was not setup in order to explain the entire cause of the leverage 
effect but to investigate the relationship between firm specific variables and the leverage 
effect. Therefore, the low R-squares for the pooled regressions is not unexpected, but the 
relative high R-square for the fixed effects regressions gives a good indication of the impact 
of firm specific variables as a whole.  
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6. Conclusion 
This final chapter summarizes the thesis and discuss the results derived in chapter 5 in 
consideration to the research questions stipulated in chapter one. Lastly, suggestion for further 
research that was found during the study is presented.  
6.1. Summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the potential relationship between firm specific 
variables and the leverage effect, to try and fill the missing gap in the research field. The 
stipulated research questions are: “Do firm specific variables impact the size of the leverage 
effect?” and “If so, how and to what extent do the variables impact the leverage effect?”.    
The study is conducted on 1,311 U.S. companies active on NASDAQ or the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) between 1996 and 2015. Two GARCH models are applied to estimate the 
asymmetric volatility; the GJR-GARCH(1,1) and the EGARCH(1,1). The use of 1,311 
companies and two models yielded a total of 26,220 asymmetric volatility estimations, which 
was analyzed using panel data with the firm specific variables as explanatory variables. The 
firm variables are chosen based on previous research and their potential impact on the 
leverage effect given by the theoretical framework. Five different panel data regressions for 
the GJR-GARCH and the EGARCH are used in order to obtain a robust result.  
The findings show that two out of the eight variables are significant in impacting the size of 
the leverage effect; the firm size and the beta. The findings are not entirely in line with the 
previous study by Voogd & Geschiere (2015). They found significance for the NPM and P/E-
ratio variables, which this paper deemed insignificant. However, both studies are consistent in 
finding a positive relationship between firm size and the leverage effect. Both studies also 
reject the debt-to-equity ratio which contradicts the original hypothesis behind the leverage 
effect from Black (1976).  
The positive sign of the firm size coefficient indicates a positive relationship between firm 
size and the leverage effect. Based on this result are larger firms more prone to volatility 
asymmetry compared to smaller firms. A theory is that larger firms are subject to more 
attention, minimizing the information asymmetry between larger firms and the market. This 
would increase the trading volume and liquidity which in turn can explain why there is a 
positive relationship between firm size and the leverage effect. The finding seems to be based 
on other principals than risk since smaller firms are deemed riskier than larger firms a 
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negative relationship between a firm’s size and the leverage effect would be expected if the 
relationship was based on the risk factor.   
The other variable deemed significant in all the applied panel data regressions is the beta. The 
beta variable has not been used in previous research and hence the result is unique for this 
paper. The sign of the coefficient is positive, which is intuitive since larger systematic risk is 
likely to make investors more prone to overreactions, increasing the sensitivity to negative 
shocks.  
Observing the model as a whole, it is possible to determine that the R-squares are high for the 
panel data regressions that use fixed effect in the cross-sectional dimension (see table 8). The 
finding indicates that firm specific variables in general determine a relative large part of the 
total size of the leverage effect. However, the relative low R-square for the pooled regressions 
indicates that there are many variables not applied in this thesis that could be included in 
order to obtain a better fit for the model. The problem is that there exist numerous firm 
variables and some might not be possible to measure in practice. 
To conclude and revert back to the research questions, it can be concluded that firm specific 
variables do impact the size of the leverage effect. However, not all firm variables are 
significant in impacting the size of the leverage effect. The size and sign of the coefficients 
also differs between the variables, with some being positively correlated to the leverage effect 
while others show a negative correlation.  
6.2. Further Research  
The topic of the relationship between firm specific variables and the leverage effect is still 
very much unexplored. There are many steps left that could be taken in order to gain a better 
understanding of the topic.  
First and foremost, adding additional firm specific variables could yield a more 
comprehensive result. In a similar manner, by taking a more in-depth look into each variable 
and the root of the relationship with the asymmetric volatility can provide additional insights.  
One variable used in this paper that could be developed further is the industry variable. By 
applying for example an industry risk measure instead of dummy variables the variable can be 
included in the fixed effects models and hence possible yield interesting results. This will also 
allow for a better interpretation of the panel data result for the variable.  
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The data could also be approached in a different manner, by not using the second requirement 
in this paper the sample will be more diversified and hence potentially capturing more 
interesting results. 
A final remark is that it could be of interest to look beyond the firm specific variables and 
instead apply market variables. The changes to asymmetric volatility over time indicate that 
the market conditions affect the asymmetric volatility. Market variables could include 
measurement such as stock momentum, GDP, market index, etc. as explanatory variables.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A - GJR-GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) Estimations from EViews 
The tables below show two examples of the asymmetric volatility estimations for the GJR-
GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) models, estimated in EViews. GJR-GARCH is presented in 
table 1 and EGARCH is presented in table 2. The asymmetric volatility is captured by the 
coefficient RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) in the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model and in C(3) for 
EGARCH. The models estimate the leverage effect with different signs, the GRJ-GARCH 
model uses a positive sign and EGARCH uses a negative sign.  
 
Table 1: GJR-GARCH(1,1) regression that shows the asymmetric volatility 
Dependent Variable: MICROSEMI 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Sample: 1/02/1996 12/31/1997 
Included observations: 522 
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(1) + C(2)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(3)*RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) + C(4)*GARCH(-1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 8.67E-05 2.61E-05 3.323638 0.0009 
RESID(-1)^2 0.008633 0.022691 0.380442 0.7036 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0.095579 0.039410 2.425271 0.0153 
GARCH(-1) 0.863934 0.042647 20.25764 0.0000 
 
Table 2: EGARCH(1,1) regression that shows the asymmetric volatility 
Dependent Variable: MICROSEMI 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Sample: 1/02/1996 12/31/1997 
Included observations: 522 
Convergence achieved after 14 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
LOG(GARCH)=C(1)+C(2)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)))+C(3)*RESID(-
1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(4)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -0.557102 0.126649 -4.398775 0.0000 
C(2) 0.147258 0.035598 4.136662 0.0000 
C(3) -0.094415 0.029224 -3.230703 0.0012 
C(4) 0.934608 0.016875 55.38525 0.0000 
R-squared -0.001800     Mean dependent var 0.001362 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000120     S.D. dependent var 0.032144 
S.E. of regression 0.032142     Akaike info criterion -4.067396 
Sum squared resid 0.539281     Schwarz criterion -4.034770 
Log likelihood 1065.590     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.054617 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.129162   
R-squared -0.001800     Mean dependent var 0.001362 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000120     S.D. dependent var 0.032144 
S.E. of regression 0.032142     Akaike info criterion -4.089577 
Sum squared resid 0.539281     Schwarz criterion -4.056951 
Log likelihood 1071.380     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.076798 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.129162   
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Appendix B - Table for Firm Variables over time and structure of Panel Data 
Table 1 show the average for each firm specific variable during a two-year period and 
illustrates that the variables vary over time.   
Table 2 show an example of how the structure of the panel data was set up in the excel file for 
one company.  
 
Table 1: Average for the firm specific variables each two-year period 
Years D/E P/E Firm size6 NPM EV/EBITDA Beta Dividend 
1996-1997 25.955 26.438 21262950 387.447 73.528 0.576 1.347 
1998-1999 0.533 25.871 23832815 194.286 50.605 0.599 1.281 
2000-2001 82.017 22.473 9081067 -26.466 9.195 0.630 1.860 
2002-2003 79.85 25.065 8204279 -57.942 1.106 0.682 1.576 
2004-2005 68.738 27.789 10185795 -148.420 12.563 1.011 1.347 
2006-2007 70.172 25.363 12462538 -201.812 -16.319 1.006 1.416 
2008-2009 75.156 20.792 10632106 -102.955 5.613 1.029 2.288 
2010-2011 65.591 26.714 11573225 -32.154 8.114 1.124 1.533 
2012-2013 66.151 21.776 13378668 -67.920 -31.006 1.020 1.753 
2014-2015 73.435 27.029 15398023 -381.741 10.856 0.896 1.601 
 
Table 2: Example of the panel data structure in Excel 
Year Company Gamma D/E P/E Log EV NPM EV/EBITDA Beta Dividend 
1996-1997 Apple -0.183 74.05 9.2 14,64 -11.53 -2.357 0.744 1.905 
1998-1999 Apple 0.097 37.05 17.5 15,58 7.5 8.937 1.271 0 
2000-2001 Apple -0.973 7.765 16.4 14,98 4.69 5.080 1.726 0 
2002-2003 Apple 0.054 7.46 79.6 14,64 1.12 10.695 1.114 0 
2004-2005 Apple 0.134 0 100.8 16,93 6.455 17.903 1.554 0 
2006-2007 Apple 0.172 0 41.75 18,28 12.43 20.819 1.323 0 
2008-2009 Apple 0.118 0 33.15 18,56 17.105 11.405 0.947 0 
2010-2011 Apple 0.224 0 27.65 19,60 22.705 10.636 0.871 0 
2012-2013 Apple 0.255 6.85 13.35 20,03 24.17 8.679 0.988 0.995 
2014-2015 Apple 0.361 42.82 15.6 20,26 22.23 8.611 1.036 1.935 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 In thousands USD 
III 
 
Appendix C - Descriptive Statistics of the Asymmetric Volatility 
This appendix show two histograms estimated in EViews, regarding the total sample of 
asymmetric volatility for both the GJR-GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) models. It also show 
a descriptive statistic table for the EGARCH model (the GJR-GARCH(1,1) is provided in 
subsection 5.1.).  
 
Figure 1: Histogram from EViews for GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
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Figure 2: Histogram from EViews for EGARCH(1,1) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics over EGARCH (1,1) asymmetric volatility 
Period Mean Median Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob. 
1996-1997 0.024 0.037 0.110 -1.298 7.645 226.5 0.000 
1998-1999 0.030 0.049 0.113 -1.668 9.009 378.0 0.000 
2000-2001 0.024 0.031 0.134 1.034 10.610 497.5 0.000 
2002-2003 0.044 0.062 0.189 -5.984 73.910 40499.6 0.000 
2004-2005 0.032 0.041 0.135 -0.561 4.804 36.1 0.000 
2006-2007 0.020 0.027 0.123 -1.265 8.101 259.4 0.000 
2008-2009 0.074 0.078 0.065 0.021 5.204 38.8 0.000 
2010-2011 0.107 0.112 0.149 -0.864 11.067 3760.8 0.000 
2012-2013 0.036 0.042 0.123 -0.441 5.669 63.2 0.000 
2014-2015 0.045 0.073 0.147 -0.786 3.984 27.5 0.000 
Total 0.049 0.055 0.182 -0.425 -0,268 18655.06 0.000 
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Appendix D - Figures of the GJR-GARCH(1,1) Asymmetric Volatility 
This appendix shows histogram figures with a time dimension in order to clarify how the 
asymmetric volatility changes over time for the asymmetric volatilities estimated from GJR-
GARCH (1,1). Figure 3 and 4 only show the negative asymmetric volatilities and figure 2 and 
5 only show the positive asymmetric volatilities. Making it easier to interpret the result 
regarding how negative and positive values changes over time. 
Figure 1: Histogram over all the asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
 
Figure 2: Histogram over the positive asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
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Figure 3: Histogram over the negative asymmetric values from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
 
 
Figure 4: The distribution of positive asymmetric volatility over time from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
 
 
Figure 5: The distribution of negative asymmetric volatility over time from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
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Appendix E - Figures of the EGARCH(1,1) Asymmetric Volatility 
This appendix shows histogram figures with a time dimension in order to clarify how the 
asymmetric volatility changes over time for the asymmetric volatilities estimated from 
EGARCH.  Figure 3 and 5 only show the negative asymmetric volatilities and figure 2 and 6 
only show the positive asymmetric volatilities. Making it easier to interpret the result 
regarding how negative and positive values changes over time. Since the models estimate the 
asymmetric volatility with different signs the EGARCH has been transformed so that the 
models correspond with each other.  
Figure 1: Histogram over all the asymmetric volatility from EGARCH(1,1) 
 
Figure 2: Histogram over the positive asymmetric volatility from EGARCH(1,1) 
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Figure 3: Histogram over the negative asymmetric values from EGARCH(1,1) 
 
Figure 4: Histogram that shows the distribution of the asymmetric volatility over time 
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Figure 5: The distribution of negative asymmetric volatility over time from EGARCH(1,1) 
 
Figure 6: The distribution of positive asymmetric volatility over time from EGARCH (1,1) 
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Appendix F - Redundant Fixed Effects Test and Hausman Significant Test  
The redundant fixed effect test and Hausmant test for panel data model that uses the 
asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) is presented below. 
GJR-GARCH tests: 
Table 1: Redundant fixed effect test in the cross-sectional dimension for GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
 Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 1.076375 (1271.9029) 0.0389 
Cross-section Chi-square 1454.2798 1271 0.0002 
 
 
Table 2: Redundant fixed effect test in the period dimension for GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
 Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Period F 16.93339 (9.10291) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 151.532527 9 0.0000 
 
 
Table 3: Hausman test for panel data with GJR-GARCH estimations(1,1) 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Stastic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Period random 23.783 7 0.0012 
 
EGARCH tests: 
 
Table 4: Redundant fixed effect test in the cross-sectional dimension for EGARCH 
 Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 1.113216 (183,1315) 0.0482 
Cross-section Chi-square 216.909587 183 0.0438 
 
 
Table 5: Redundant fixed effect test in the period dimension for EGARCH 
 Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Period F 4.143150 (9,1489) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 37.249586 9 0.0000 
 
 
Table 6: Hausman test for panel data with EGARCH estimations 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Stastic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Period random 15.792 7 0.0271 
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Appendix G - GJR-GARCH(1,1) Panel Data Regressions 
 
This appendix shows every estimated panel data regression that uses the GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
estimations for the asymmetric volatility. The regressions are presented in the following 
order: 
1. Pooled regression. 
2. Pooled regression with industry dummies. 
3. Panel regression with fixed effects in cross-section. 
4. Panel regression with fixed effects in period. 
5. Panel regression with fixed effects in both the cross-section and period dimension. 
Table 1: Pooled regression with asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/28/17 Time 11:55 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.093308 0.011762 -7.933182 0.0000 
D/E 8.64E-06 2.09E-05 0.412460 0.6800 
P/E 1.10E-05 8.61E-05 0.127764 0.8983 
Log Firm size 0.009449 0.000902 10.47003 0.0000 
NPM -2.21E-05 5.89E-06 -3.751075 0.0002 
EV/EBITDA 6.30E-06 1.69E-05 0.371847 0.7100 
Beta 0.030611 0.003911 7.826009 0.0000 
Dividend 0.000541 0.000827 0.654670 0.5127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R-squared 0.028487 Mean dependent var 0.068367 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027827 S.D. dependent var 0.175953 
S.E of regression 0.173487 Akaike info criterion -0.664650 
Sum squared resid 310.0073 Schwarz criterion -0.659031 
Log likelihood 3433.608 Hannan-Quinn criter -0.662751 
F-stastic 43.14619 Durbin-Watson stat 1.940185 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 2: Pooled regression with dummies with asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/28/17 Time 12:09 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.105507 0.021934 -4.810310 0.0000 
D/E 1.20E-05 2.18E-05 0.548566 0.5833 
P/E 1.47E-05 8.64E-05 0.169600 0.8653 
Log Firm size 0.009449 0.000917 10.30933 0.0000 
NPM -2.23E-05 5.88E-06 -3.781278 0.0002 
EV/EBITDA 5.83E-06 1.69E-05 0.344280 0.7306 
Beta 0.030635 0.003946 7.764356 0.0000 
Dividend 0.000740 0.000878 0.843112 0.3992 
Agriculture -0.125205 0.045015 -2.781427 0.0054 
Construction 0.005413 0.025874 0.209215 0.8343 
Finance 0.011467 0.019143 0.598994 0.5492 
Manufacturing 0.010255 0.018844 0.544177 0.5863 
Mining -0.003924 0.020278 -0.193523 0.8466 
Retail trade 0.019562 0.019802 0.987861 0.3232 
Services 0.023292 0.019521 1.193161 0.2328 
Transportation 0.006915 0.019498 0.354673 0.7228 
Wholase trade 0.028999 0.021104 1.374113 0.1694 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R-squared 0.030860 Mean dependent var 0.068367 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029353 S.D. dependent var 0.175953 
S.E of regression 0.173351 Akaike info criterion -0.665349 
Sum squared resid 309.2504 Schwarz criterion -0.653408 
Log likelihood 3446.208 Hannan-Quinn criter -0.661313 
F-stastic 20.48050 Durbin-Watson stat 1.944606 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 3: Fixed in cross-section dimension with asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/28/17 Time 11:56 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.102141 0.039725 -2.571242 0.0101 
D/E 5.24E-05 3.63E-05 1.444156 0.1487 
P/E 4.67E-05 0.000102 0.455448 0.6488 
Log Firm size 0.009897 0.002925 3.383384 0.0007 
NPM -5.64E-06 9.32E-06 -0.604830 0.5453 
EV/EBITDA 4.98E-06 1.81E-05 0.274688 0.7836 
Beta 0.030184 0.005233 5.768500 0.0000 
Dividend -0.000226 0.001469 -0.154076 0.8776 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Fixed in period dimension with asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/28/17 Time 11:57 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.098923 0.011849 -8.348349 0.0000 
D/E 5.93E-06 2.09E-05 0.283966 0.7764 
P/E -1.26E-05 8.60E-05 -0.146125 0.8838 
Log Firm size 0.009773 0.000903 10.81897 0.0000 
NPM -2.22E-05 5.85E-06 -3.801880 0.0001 
EV/EBITDA 7.02E-06 1.68E-05 0.416919 0.6767 
Beta 0.033266 0.004317 7.706119 0.0000 
Dividend 0.000282 0.000831 0.338664 0.7349 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.156321 Mean dependent var 0.068367 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036904 S.D. dependent var 0.175953 
S.E of regression 0.172675 Akaike info criterion -0.559128 
Sum squared resid 269.2158 Schwarz criterion 0.339283 
Log likelihood 4160.748 Hannan-Quinn criter -0.255480 
F-stastic 1.309031 Durbin-Watson stat 2.195151 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.042665 Mean dependent var 0.068367 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041176 S.D. dependent var 0.175953 
S.E of regression 0.172292 Akaike info criterion -0.677605 
Sum squared resid 305.4834 Schwarz criterion -0.665663 
Log likelihood 3509.374 Hannan-Quinn criter -0.673569 
F-stastic 28.66427 Durbin-Watson stat 1.930916 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 5: Fixed effects in both dimensions with asymmetric volatility from GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/28/17 Time 11:58 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.194033 0.047136 -4.116493 0.0000 
D/E 3.10E-05 3.64E-05 0.850035 0.3953 
P/E 6.21E-07 0.000103 0.006057 0.9952 
Log Firm size 0.016399 0.003389 4.838841 0.0000 
NPM -6.86E-06 9.26E-06 -0.741017 0.4587 
EV/EBITDA 5.12E-06 1.80E-05 0.284537 0.7760 
Beta 0.034685 0.005936 5.843560 0.0000 
Dividend -0.000886 0.001492 -0.594093 0.5525 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.170233 Mean dependent var 0.068367 
Adjusted R-squared 0.051839 S.D. dependent var 0.175953 
S.E of regression 0.171331 Akaike info criterion -0.574009 
Sum squared resid 264.7767 Schwarz criterion 0.330724 
Log likelihood 4246.442 Hannan-Quinn criter -0.268224 
F-stastic 1.437856 Durbin-Watson stat 2.187563 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Appendix H - EGARCH(1,1) Panel Data Regressions 
 
This appendix shows every estimated panel data regression that uses the EGARCH(1,1) 
estimations for the asymmetric volatility. The regressions are presented in the following 
order: 
1. Pooled regression. 
2. Pooled regression with industry dummies. 
3. Panel regression with fixed effects in cross-section. 
4. Panel regression with fixed effects in period. 
5. Panel regression with fixed effects in both the cross-section and period dimension. 
Table 1: Pooled regression with asymmetric volatility from EGARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/29/17 Time 13:24 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob, 
C -0.096920 0.007539 -12.85654 0.0000 
D/E -1.58E-05 1.34E-05 -1.174716 0.2401 
P/E 5.84E-05 5.52E-05 1.058771 0.2897 
Log Firm size 0.008568 0.000579 14.80092 0.0000 
NPM -8.88E-06 3.79E-06 -2.344919 0.0190 
EV/EBITDA -1.51E-06 1.09E-05 -0.138271 0.8900 
Beta 0.024328 0.002508 9.700063 0.0000 
Dividend 0.001235 0.000531 2.327087 0.2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R-squared 0.048425 Mean dependent var 0.047319 
Adjusted R-squared 0.047783 S.D. dependent var 0.114433 
S,E of regression 0.111665 Akaike info criterion -1.545853 
Sum squared resid 129.4045 Schwarz criterion -1.540270 
Log likelihood 8035.615 Hannan-Quinn criter -1.543967 
F-stastic 75.44627 Durbin-Watson stat 1.882709 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 2: Pooled regression with dummies with asymmetric volatility from EGARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/29/17 Time 13:28 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob, 
C -0.109563 0.014104 -7.767977 0.0000 
D/E -1.91E-05 1.40E-05 -1.370412 0.1706 
P/E 5.60E-05 5.54E-05 1.011195 0.3119 
Log Firm size 0.008504 0.000588 14.46154 0.0000 
NPM -9.02E-06 3.79E-06 -2.381026 0.0173 
EV/EBITDA -2.13E-06 1.09E-05 -0.195175 0.8453 
Beta 0.024881 0.002530 9.832919 0.0000 
Dividend 0.000996 0.000564 1.766646 0.4773 
Agriculture -0.056472 0.028976 -1.948890 0.0513 
Construction -0.017881 0.016613 -1.076330 0.2818 
Finance 0.017040 0.012321 1.382967 0.1667 
Manufacturing 0.012665 0.012129 1.044176 0.2964 
Mining 0.005554 0.013049 0.425609 0.6704 
Retail trade 0.017434 0.012735 1.368995 0.1710 
Services 0.018685 0.012564 1.487179 0.1370 
Transportation 0.014036 0.012548 1.118585 0.2633 
Wholase trade 0.014684 0.013580 1.081272 0.2796 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R-squared 0.050528 Mean dependent var 0.047319 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049063 S.D. dependent var 0.114433 
S,E of regression 0.111590 Akaike info criterion -1.546333 
Sum squared resid 129.1184 Schwarz criterion -1.534469 
Log likelihood 8047.109 Hannan-Quinn criter -1.542325 
F-stastic 34.48813 Durbin-Watson stat 1.886913 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 3: Fixed in cross-section dimension with asymmetric volatility from EGARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/29/17 Time 13:29 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob, 
C -0.132000 0.025263 -5.225027 0.0000 
D/E -2.78E-05 2.30E-05 -1.205158 0.2282 
P/E 3.09E-05 6.50E-05 0.475863 0.6342 
Log Firm size 0.011291 0.001862 6.064678 0.0000 
NPM -5.90E-07 5.90E-06 -0.099996 0.9203 
EV/EBITDA -5.10E-07 1.16E-05 -0.043998 0.9649 
Beta 0.023459 0.003332 7.041073 0.0000 
Dividend 0.000600 0.000936 0.641260 0.5214 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Fixed in period dimension with asymmetric volatility from EGARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/29/17 Time 13:31 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob, 
C -0.097657 0.007578 -12.88716 0.0000 
D/E -1.43E-05 1.33E-05 -1.069190 0.2850 
P/E 5.59E-05 5.50E-05 1.016893 0.3092 
Log Firm size 0.008835 0.000578 15.27841 0.0000 
NPM -8.90E-06 3.76E-06 -2.369953 0.0178 
EV/EBITDA -2.10E-07 1.08E-05 -0.019448 0.9845 
Beta 0.021730 0.002763 7.864001 0.0000 
Dividend 0.000731 0.000532 1.372887 0.1698 
 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.183298 Mean dependent var 0.047319 
Adjusted R-squared 0.068689 S.D. dependent var 0.114433 
S,E of regression 0.110433 Akaike info criterion -1.453945 
Sum squared resid 111.0631 Schwarz criterion -0.561353 
Log likelihood 8829.338 Hannan-Quinn criter -1.152377 
F-stastic 1.599332 Durbin-Watson stat 2.195127 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.066049 Mean dependent var 0.047319 
Adjusted R-squared 0.064608 S.D. dependent var 0.114433 
S,E of regression 0.110674 Akaike info criterion -1.562815 
Sum squared resid 127.0078 Schwarz criterion -1.550951 
Log likelihood 8132.697 Hannan-Quinn criter -1.558806 
F-stastic 45.83071 Durbin-Watson stat 1.870569 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Table 5: Fixed regression in both dimensions with asymmetric volatility from EGARCH(1,1) 
Dependent Variable: Leverage effect 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 04/29/17 Time 13:37 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Periods included: 1272 
Cross-sections included: 1272 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10308 
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob, 
C -0.166780 0.029905 -5.577021 0.0000 
D/E -3.58E-05 2.30E-05 -1.553874 0.1202 
P/E 1.90E-05 6.49E-05 0.292077 0.7702 
Log Firm size 0.014111 0.002152 6.557983 0.0000 
NPM -1.24E-06 5.84E-06 -0.212891 0.8314 
EV/EBITDA 1.20E-07 1.15E-05 0.010443 0.9917 
Beta 0.020895 0.003772 5.539792 0.0000 
Dividend -0.000537 0.000948 -0.566524 0.5711 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.200869 Mean dependent var 0.047319 
Adjusted R-squared 0.087824 S.D. dependent var 0.114433 
S,E of regression 0.109292 Akaike info criterion -1.473962 
Sum squared resid 108.6736 Schwarz criterion -0.575088 
Log likelihood 8942.284 Hannan-Quinn criter -1.170271 
F-stastic 1.776900 Durbin-Watson stat 2.186167 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
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Appendix I - Figures for Asymmetric Volatility in Industries  
This appendix shows two figures of the average asymmetric volatility for each industry. The 
theoretical framework in 2.5.3 argues that some industries might be more affected by the 
leverage effect. However, the figures in this appendix show that each industry is influenced 
approximately the same regarding the leverage effect.  
 
Figure 1: Average asymmetric volatility in each industry 
 
 
Figure 2: Average asymmetric volatility over time in each industry  
 
 
 
